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INFLUENCES OF AMBIGUITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM OF IRAQ 
SABAH AL-BAWI* 
When the organizers of the University of Pennsylvania’s Con-
ference on the Rule of Law in Iraq and Afghanistan asked me to 
present on one of the most important challenges facing Iraq during 
the coming decade, I chose to examine the ambiguity of the provi-
sions of Iraq’s Constitution that relate to Iraq’s administrative sys-
tem.  The ambiguity in these provisions is one of the most compli-
cated problems facing Iraq, and it is rooted in the fervent 
discussions between new Iraqi politicians and leaders about the 
shape that the Republic of Iraq should adopt: the simple or the fed-
eral shape. 
Although the Iraqi Constitution has adopted a binary system 
with a federal authority when it comes to the relations with the 
Kurdistan region, and a decentralized administration when it 
comes to the relation between the central government and the gov-
ernorates that are not incorporated into a region, the Constitution’s 
unclear provisions have caused several types of conflicts in differ-
ent fields.  In this present brief, I will focus on two examples to 
prove the influence of the ambiguous provisions on the adminis-
trative system of Iraq. 
1. FIRST EXAMPLE: THE AMBIGUOUS DECENTRALIZED 
ADMINISTRATION 
Decentralization simply means that recognized local interests 
will be run by elected commissions that should cooperate with the 
central government and submit to the central government’s super-
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vision when fulfilling their missions.  The elected commission runs 
the local interests according to laws that are passed by the central 
legislative authority.  Any contrary resolutions adopted by the lo-
cal commissions that conflict with the central authority’s laws or 
resolutions are voidable. 
But when we analyze the decentralized administration that has 
been adopted by the Iraqi Constitution, we find a special and un-
known type of decentralization that could be described as closer to 
confederacy than to decentralization.  According to Article 122, 
Section 5 of the Iraqi Constitution,1 the elected commissions that 
run the local interests of the governorates are not compelled to co-
operate with the central executive power continuously or to submit 
to any type of supervision or control by the capitol.  Moreover, ac-
cording to Article 2, Section 1 of the Law of Governorates Law,3 the 
provincial councils have a legislative authority that legislates in 
undetermined fields, while other federal authorities have deter-
mined fields to practice its specializations in.  The local legislative 
authority supersedes the federal legislative authority when it 
comes to shared powers between the federal authority, the gover-
norates, and with regard to the un-exclusive powers of the federal 
government according to Article 115 of the Constitution.  This is 
known to be strange in a decentralized system.  The surprise here 
is that the provincial councils are not compelled to obey the enact-
ments of the central legislative power.  Even more surprising is 
that, according to Article 115 of the Iraqi Constitution itself, in the 
case of a dispute or conflict between federal and local laws about 
powers shared between them, priority shall be given to the law of 
the governorate, and not to the federal law. Moreover, Article 110 
enumerates powers that are exclusively held by the federal gov-
ernment, but Article 123 permits the federal government to dele-
gate even its exclusive powers to the governorates according to a 
law should be issued later. 
In addition, the Constitution is ambiguous about the mecha-
nisms for defining and exercising the broad powers granted to the 
governorates that are not incorporated into a region.  Article 122, 
Section 2 of the Constitution stipulates, “governorates that are not 
incorporated in a region shall be granted broad administrative and 
 
1 Article 122, Section 5, Doustour Joumhourait al-Iraq [The Constitution of 
the Republic of Iraq] of 2005. 
2 Article 2, Section 1, Law of Governorates Law No. 21 of 2008 (Iraq). 
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financial authorities to enable them to manage their affairs in ac-
cordance with the principle of decentralized administration, and 
this shall be regulated by law.”  However, neither the provision of 
the Constitution did define the meaning of the broad authorities it 
grants, nor did the aforementioned law of the governorates. 
This unclear system of administration has created several chal-
lenges for the governorates and for the federal government.  The 
constitutional and legal provisions raise the governorates to the 
sky, but the lack of a mechanism for defining their authority 
throws them to the earth.  This situation has created conflicts be-
tween the two levels of government: governorates cling to the pro-
visions granting them broad authorities, and the federal govern-
ment clings to the provisions establishing a decentralized system 
with ambiguous mechanisms for distributing power.  This conflict 
has obstructed the goals of national development, weakened the 
people’s trust in their elected provincial councils, increased re-
sentment as a result of poor services provided by disabled local 
commissions, and created a spirit of hostility between the provin-
cial councils and central ministries. 
2. SECOND EXAMPLE: THE AMBIGUITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS FOR MANAGING REGIONAL OIL AND GAS 
A constitutional provision has created one of the most compli-
cated problems between the federal government and local gov-
ernments of governorates and regions.  Article 112, Section 1 of the 
Constitution stipulates, “the federal government, with the produc-
ing governorates and regional governments, shall undertake the 
management of oil and gas extracted from present fields . . . .”  
This provision has created a fiercely antagonistic relationship be-
tween the federal and regional governments, especially the region-
al government of Kurdistan.  Article 112, Section 1 only gives cen-
tral government just guidelines for undertaking the management 
of oil and gas extracted from current fields, but it does not provide 
it any specializations for exploitation or any other use.  The provi-
sion also only applies to present fields, not future ones.  Further-
more, the provision only applies to oil and gas already extracted, 
and not to oil and gas still in the bottom of the earth. 
The regional government of Kurdistan clings to a narrow inter-
pretation of the provision, explaining that the federal government 
should cooperate with the local governments to manage the ex-
tracted oil and gas from the present fields in 2005 only.  They argue 
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that according to Article 112, the exploitation of oil and gas not yet 
extracted from present and future fields should be controlled by 
the regional governments.  The federal government asserts that it 
has the authority to control exploitation, citing Article 111 of the 
Constitution, which states, “Oil and gas are owned by all the peo-
ple of Iraq in all the regions and governorates.” 
Although there is a national consensus that the Constitution 
should be changed, amending the ambiguous Iraqi Constitution is 
the largest challenge, since it is one of the most inflexible constitu-
tions in the world.  It is our social problem, not our social contract, 
as Jean-Jacques Rousseau (June 28, 1712–July 2, 1778) supposes. 
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